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We present a general equilibrium model of conﬂict to investigate
whether the prevalence of democracy is sufﬁcient to foster the perpetual peace hypothesized by Immanuel Kant and whether the world
would necessarily become more peaceful as more countries adopt
democratic institutions. Our exploration suggests that neither hypothesis is true. The desire of incumbent leaders with unfavorable
economic performance to hold on to power generates an incentive
to initiate conﬂict and salvage their position—with some probability.
An equilibrium with positive war frequency is sustained even if all
nations were to adopt representative democratic institutions and even
in the absence of an appropriative motive for war.

Thus as far as right is concerned, republicanism is in itself
the original basis of every kind of civil constitution, and it
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only remains to ask whether it is the only constitution which
can lead to a perpetual peace. [Kant (1795) 1991, p. 100]

Immanuel Kant’s conclusion was that, indeed, democracy offers the
prospect of attaining perpetual peace. With the prospect of a fully democratic world appearing far out of reach, however, Kant’s hypothesis has
been but a theoretical possibility. Until recently, that is. The end of the
Cold War has unleashed a new era onto existing national and international political institutions and has led to a signiﬁcant increase in
democratic governance.1 As countries that 10 or 20 years ago would
hardly have been expected to institute democratic reforms have done
so, optimistic speculation as to the beneﬁcial consequences of the spread
of democracy for the peaceful resolution of international conﬂict has
been encouraged.
Doyle (1986) has championed Kant’s liberal internationalism as the
key paradigm for understanding the peaceful relationships between democracies based on their observed caution toward war’s costliness and
appreciation of the rights of individuals in foreign republics.2 Russett
(1993) classiﬁes the two major arguments that make the Kant hypothesis
operational as those based on “norms and culture” and “structural and
institutional constraints.” The former emphasizes that a fundamental
basis of democracies is that domestic disagreements are settled by compromise and nonviolent means. This domestic pattern in turn creates
an atmosphere or norm by which international disagreements between
democratic governments would also be resolved. The latter proposes
that democracies have internal checks and balances of authority even
with regard to foreign policy, such that any foreign policy adventure
must be widely discussed and the public’s support gained prior to embarking on a war. This institutional sluggishness makes it less likely that
wars will actually be undertaken and more likely that potential confrontations can be resolved peacefully. Such optimistic assessments of
prospects for perpetual peace in the face of an increasingly democratic
world, however, are not universally shared. Howard (1983) points to the
irony of how the ascendancy of Kant’s liberal peace view coincided with
the rise of national militarism in Europe during the late eighteenth to
mid-twentieth centuries. He observes that the spread of democracy
brought by “the French revolution ushered in an era of wars even greater
1
Gastil (1986, 1996) reports that while in 1986 there were 56 free countries, 56 partially
free countries, and 55 countries that were not free, in 1996, 76 countries were free, 62
countries were partially free, and 53 were not free. His deﬁnition of freedom is closely
associated with democratic governance.
2
Doyle (1986) also emphasizes Kant’s point that while democracies may form a separate
peace between themselves, they will use liberal reasons for conﬂict with nondemocracies.
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in their savagery and scope” (p. 27). Further, since history has not
provided us with a period in which only democratic states governed or
a period in which there has been a dramatic and sustained shift in the
population of mature electoral democracies, empirical evidence on the
propensity of democracies to engage in war is of limited scope for addressing this issue. Thus to shed additional light, we must resort to an
investigation of the theoretical basis for the relevant arguments.
In this paper, we present a general equilibrium model of conﬂict to
investigate whether the prevalence of democracy is sufﬁcient to foster
the perpetual peace hypothesized by Kant and whether the world would
necessarily become more peaceful as more countries adopt democratic
institutions. Our primary goal is to present a framework that identiﬁes
issues relevant for the attainment of a more peaceful, perhaps perpetually peaceful, world. We build a model in which the equilibrium frequency of war is endogenously determined by the relative prevalence
of democratic and nondemocratic regimes, the relative importance of
an appropriative motive for war, and the inﬂuence of a war’s outcome
to affect an incumbent leader’s ability to hold on to power.
We accept Kant’s view that in a world populated with nondemocratic
regimes, war will persist. Certainly this is consistent with historical evidence. As Kant reasoned, war persists with nondemocratic regimes because the potential costs associated with wars are invariably borne disproportionately by the general population and not by the nation’s
leaders. The potential gains from appropriation, on the other hand,
would be usurped by the leaders of these nondemocratic regimes. As
he observed, “under a constitution where the subject is not a citizen,
and which is therefore not republican, it is the simplest thing in the
world to go to war.… For the head of state is not a fellow citizen, but
the owner of the state, and a war will not force him to make the slightest
sacriﬁce” (p. 101). In contrast, Kant viewed democracies in a more
hopeful light. In Kant’s words,

If, as is inevitably the case under this constitution, the consent
of the citizens is required to decide whether or not war is to
be declared, it is very natural that they will have great hesitation
in embarking on so dangerous an enterprise. For this would
mean calling down on themselves all the miseries of war, such
as doing the ﬁghting themselves, supplying the costs of the war
from their own resources, painfully making good the ensuing
devastation, and, as the crowning evil, having to take upon
themselves a burden of debt which will embitter peace itself
and which can never be paid off on account of the constant
threat of new wars. [P. 100]
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To follow the essence of Kant’s argument for why a world populated
solely by democratic governments could establish a perpetual peace,
our analysis begins by examining situations in which the elimination of
all war would be Pareto-improving. Hence, trivially, if individual voters
were to determine war decisions, war would always be avoided.3
However, in our investigation, we take seriously an institutional aspect
of modern democracies largely ignored in Kant’s argument, namely,
that citizens elect leaders as their agents and do not therefore control
the day-to-day operations of government. Accordingly, imperfections
may arise from the reelection motive of partially benevolent leaders.
Speciﬁcally, the desire of incumbent leaders with unfavorable economic
performance to hold on to power generates an incentive for actions
that demonstrate their leadership abilities and allow them, with some
probability, to salvage their position. Our approach initially concentrates
on the potential role of war as a rational diversion from a democratically
elected leader’s poor domestic economic performance.4 In this setting
we ﬁnd that although the Pareto-optimal perpetual peace equilibrium
exists, a positive frequency of war is associated with stable worldwide
equilibria when leaders are only partially benevolent.
Building on these results, we then broaden our analysis by introducing
two key elements of realism. First, in addition to the diversionary motive
for conﬂict, which is never beneﬁcial for the citizens of a democracy,
we allow for additional conﬂicts that are appropriative in nature and
potentially welfare-improving.5 Second, as the world is not populated
3
Kant’s view is consistent with those of many authors who have suggested that the
twentieth century has brought forth changes in terms of regime type and technological
change in mass destruction such that no nation can be expected to gain economically
from conﬂict. Among others, see Pigou (1940, pp. 21–22), Robbins (1942, pp. 68, 71),
Wright (1965, pp. 242, 1367), Howard (1983, p. 22), and Keegan (1993, p. 59).
4
Other models of wars as a rational diversion are Richards et al. (1993), Downs and
Rocke (1994), and Smith (1996). Levy (1989) provides a broad discussion of the diversionary theory of war. Meade (1940, p. 15) and Wright (1965, pp. 112, 118) also assert
the existence of a diversionary war motive.
In a related study, Garﬁnkel (1994) demonstrated that the prevalence of democracy
would inﬂuence the frequency and severity of war in the context of only appropriative
conﬂicts. She constructs a general equilibrium model of international conﬂict in which
democracies are represented by domestic political competition between two parties facing
future electoral uncertainty. Political competition within a state in turn leads to lower
expenditures on military goods. In equilibrium this creates a strategic complementarity
that reduces the severity of conﬂict with democracies as opposed to nondemocracies.
Alesina and Spolaore (1996) also analyze international conﬂict in an economic model of
democracy. They ﬁnd that if there is a decrease in international conﬂict, there will be an
increase in the number of new countries formed from agents who have seceded and
formed new countries. Thus even with a smaller probability of conﬂict for each nation,
the existence of more nations may imply that the frequency of the occurrence of war may
not fall. As a result, they argue that the peace dividend for the world may therefore be
quite small, even with the end of the Cold War.
5
See Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas (1996) and the papers therein for a broader examination
of the role of appropriative activity and its effect on an economy’s resource allocation.
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solely by democratic governments, we incorporate into our model the
existence of nondemocratic governments whose motivation for engaging in conﬂict may differ from those of democracies. We then consider
the role of appropriative wars and nondemocratic regimes to address
the larger question of whether a more democratic world will necessarily
be more peaceful. Speciﬁcally, in the model we identify two key differences between a democracy and a nondemocracy. First, nondemocratic
leaders do not face elections and do not require as high a level of
popular support (demonstrated by winning a “fair” election) to stay in
power as democracies. Second, in nondemocracies the costs and the
possible spoils of a successful appropriative conﬂict are distributed asymmetrically. The ruling elite disproportionately beneﬁts from any gains,
and the general population disproportionately bears the costs. Differences in behavior (i.e., the relative “supply” of diversionary/appropriative wars by democracies/nondemocracies) result from these two
elements.
We conclude that the hypothesis that a perpetual peace would necessarily prevail only if all states were democratic is false, as is the hypothesis that a more democratic world would necessarily be more peaceful. Rather, the institutional details and norms regarding the structure
of democracy, trade arrangements, and alliances appear important, and
international coordination may remain integral for the achievement of
a more, and perhaps perpetually, peaceful world.

I.

Empirical Evidence

Before we introduce our theoretical framework, it is useful to provide
an overview of empirical evidence relevant for our analysis. We concentrate on two issues: evidence regarding the incidence of war by regime
type and evidence regarding the diversionary motive for war.
The evidence for the overall disinclination of democracies to engage
in war is decidedly mixed but has recently been clariﬁed in a number
of papers that distinguish between regime types of countries in conﬂict
(see, e.g., Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Morgan and Campbell 1991; Bueno
de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1993;
Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1996; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999a).
These papers provide strong historical evidence that the use of force
and wars between democracies is infrequent and that the frequency of
war increases when at least one country is a nondemocracy. For example,
using the Militarized Interstate Disputes data from the Correlates of War
Project, Russett (1993) reports no wars between democracies from 1946
to 1986. In contrast, he identiﬁes 32 yearly incidents in which a war

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.75 on Fri, 30 Nov 2012 15:12:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

war and democracy

781

involving at least one nondemocratic country occurred.6 Together, this
empirical evidence has lent support to the conjecture that if the world
consisted of just democratic regimes, conﬂict would diminish or perhaps
disappear altogether.7 However, sample size, sample selection, and definitional issues complicate any inference about the relationship between
regime type and conﬂict based on the observed data. As argued by
Morgan and Campbell (1991), since few states have been classiﬁed as
democracies in the data employed, the ﬁnding that the frequency of
full-scale conﬂicts involving at least one nondemocracy is higher than
that between two democracies could easily be a matter of chance. Unfortunately, empirical methods based on observed historical evidence
can provide only limited scope for predicting the likelihood of a democratic peace.
The importance of the diversionary motive for war decisions has been
studied in two ways. First, statistical investigations of the correlates of
war such as presented in Stoll (1984), Ostrom and Job (1986), Russett
(1990), Lian and Oneal (1993), DeRouen (1995), Hess and Orphanides
(1995, 2001), Wang (1996), and Gelpi (1997) have identiﬁed a link
between the incidence of war and the political cycle or the business
cycle or both. This evidence strongly suggests that electoral considerations may directly inﬂuence some war decisions in democracies, as is
suggested by the diversionary war motive.
More speciﬁc evidence that the diversionary motive is an important
facet of international conﬂict is available from individual case studies
provided by historians and political scientists. For example, Mansﬁeld
6
These results are presented in Russett’s table 1.2. For the more limited “use of force,”
there were eight times in which a given year experienced this type of conﬂict between
democracies, as compared to 521 in which at least one country was nondemocratic. Wars
are deﬁned as at least 1,000 battle deaths, where each country had at least 100 battle
deaths and mobilized at least 1,000 troops. The original data are described in Small and
Singer (1981). The use of force is deﬁned as a blockade or conﬂict in which there were
fewer casualties or mobilizations than needed for the deﬁnition of war. Forsythe (1992),
however, points out that during the Cold War period, the United States was engaged in
“covert action” against six non-European democracies. He concludes that “the neo-Kantian
reliance on representative decision making to avoid major war did not affect secret decisions” (p. 389).
7
Weart (1998) provides a recent exhaustive comparative case study of every borderline
case throughout recorded history in which democracies confronted one another with
military force. He concludes that well-established democracies have never made war on
each other. However, in coming to this conclusion, he distinguishes between “oligarch
republics” and “democratic republics”: the distinguishing characteristic is that the former
suppress some internal “enemy” class. He concludes that while oligarch republics have
only rarely fought each other, oligarch republics and democratic republics have fought
each other throughout history. Of course, the subtlety in implementing a deﬁnition of
democracy and the types of democracies casts doubt on the robustness of many of these
ﬁndings. In contrast, Mansﬁeld and Snyder (1995) ﬁnd that for newly democratizing
countries, the probability of engaging in conﬂict actually rises rather than falls. They point
to “domestic political competition” in the aftermath of regime change as the likely
explanation.
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and Snyder (1995) discuss and cite examples of diversionary conﬂicts
for the following democratic/democratizing regimes: mid-Victorian
Britain, the France of Napoleon III, Bismarck and Wilhelmine Germany,
and Taisho Japan (see further references therein). “In each of these
cases,” they point out, “elections were being held and political leaders
were paying close attention to public opinion in the making of foreign
policy” (p. 316). Furthermore, Mayer (1969) provides an extensive analysis of the domestic political inﬂuence on external conﬂict in Europe
during the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries. As he notes, “Precisely because their internal inﬂuence and control are tenuous, these
actors and classes are inclined to have recourse to external war which,
if successful, promises to shore up their faltering positions” (p. 294).
Mayer (1967) explores the domestic political causes of the First World
War, particularly those of Germany, an issue that is further emphasized
by Joll (1984). Finally, Hastings and Jenkins (1983) investigate the diversionary aspects of the Falklands-Malvinas conﬂict.8
These case studies can be seen as examples of von Clausewitz’s ([1837]
2000) well-known dictum that war is merely the extension of politics by
other means. For von Clausewitz, “war is not merely a political act but
a real political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, a
carrying out of the same by other means” (p. 280). This idea is also a
central element in our investigation.

II.

A General Equilibrium Model of War

To begin our investigation of regime type and the propensity of conﬂict,
we ﬁrst examine the limit case of a world populated by a large number
of identically structured democratic states. This “base case” illustrates
the rationale for attaining Kant’s perpetual peace hypothesis but also
demonstrates the fragility of the hypothesis and provides a foundation
for our more general analysis. In this section and Section III, we examine
the propensity of each democratic state to initiate conﬂict and analyze
the equilibrium implications of such strategies. Building on this foundation, in Section IV, we extend the analysis to incorporate appropriative
conﬂicts and nondemocratic regimes.
Each democratic state is assumed to be populated by ex ante identical
individuals. Leader candidates are drawn from the general population
8
The Falklands-Malvinas conﬂict is of special interest in that it provides an example in
which the diversionary motive has been invoked as a potentially important factor for both
sides of the conﬂict, a democracy and a nondemocratic regime. Levy and Vakili (1992),
in particular, use this example as an illustration that the diversionary motive may also be
operative for nondemocratic regimes. The evidence in Gelpi (1997) and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999b), however, suggests that such external conﬂict due to a diversionary
motive is not common in nondemocracies. See Sec. IVB for further discussion.
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and have idiosyncratic characteristics/abilities that affect the public’s
welfare during their stay in ofﬁce. There is a two-term limit on
leadership.
The theory is presented in the following subsections. We ﬁrst examine
individual leaders’ war decisions and then compute the propensity of
war initiation depending on the term of service. Second, we compute
the aggregate propensity of the initiation of war in equilibrium and
derive the equilibrium condition by aggregating across all states. Finally,
we examine properties of the resulting equilibria, in particular multiplicity and stability of alternative steady states and the resulting frequency of war.
A.

War Decisions in a Democracy

Our model of democracy follows the framework proposed in Hess and
Orphanides (1995). Each state consists of a large number of ex ante
identical citizens/voters. Elections are held at the beginning of every
period between either the current incumbent and a new candidate or
two new candidates. New candidates are drawn randomly from the electorate. Consumption in every period is determined by two factors: ﬁrst,
whether or not the state is engaged in war and, second, two idiosyncratic
characteristics of the elected leader. In the absence of war, consumption
equals g, a measure of a leader’s economic ability. If war erupts, consumption is the sum of g and d, a measure of the current leader’s ability
to contain the cost of war. Thus consumption, ct, is
ct p gt ⫹ st dt,

(1)

where st takes the value one or zero depending on whether the state is
engaged in war during period t. The characteristics g and d for each
potential leader are independently drawn from the cumulative distributions G(g) and D(d). By assumption, peacetime consumption is positive, with g being uniformly distributed over [0, 1], and the cost of war
characteristic, d, is equal to ⫺D with probability p and zero with probability 1 ⫺ p. We assume that information is symmetric to voters and
candidates and that the candidates’ and leaders’ idiosyncratic abilities
are unknown and become known only when put to use.9
Voters are risk-neutral and vote to select the leader who maximizes
their expected welfare, Wt:
9
This approach is sometimes referred to as “all voters are from Missouri,” the show-me
state (see Rogoff and Sibert 1988; Rogoff 1990). This assumption rules out the possibility
that a leader can claim a good war-handling ability even without entering a conﬂict. If
this were possible, then every leader would claim that a critical situation had happened
and was successfully avoided, and that the leader deserved great praise and support. But
this is simply not veriﬁable.
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where v is the discount factor, 0 ! v ! 1. Voting is based on information
regarding the candidates’ characteristics g and d. Thus, when an election
is held between two new candidates, voters are indifferent between the
two since both candidates would yield, in expectation, the same welfare.
We denote this expected welfare associated with a new leader of un–
known characteristics by W.10 The only interesting choice faced by voters
occurs when an election is held between an incumbent leader and a
new candidate. In that case, voters evaluate whether expected welfare
–
associated with voting for the incumbent exceeds W using the information known about the incumbent. If so, they vote to reelect the
incumbent; otherwise they opt for a new leader.
Leaders derive rents x per period when in ofﬁce. We assume that they
are only partially benevolent so that in making decisions they maximize
a linear combination of their rent and the public’s welfare. Let p denote
the probability with which they will be reelected. Then a leader’s welfare
is
Vt p (1 ⫺ r)Wt ⫹ r(x ⫹ vxp),

(3)

where r is a measure of a leader’s selﬁshness, that is, the weight he
places on the rents from being in ofﬁce rather than the public’s welfare.
During a term, a leader is faced with the possibility of international
conﬂict. Most often, these conﬂicts can be resolved peacefully, at essentially no welfare cost to the public.11 To examine the propensity to
engage in warfare at the individual state level, we assume that both
voters and leaders in any individual state take the probability that war
may be forced on the state in any term as exogenously given and equal
to a.12 Given this probability, we can then determine the extent to which
a leader may have the incentive to engage the state in a war that could
potentially have been avoided. Hess and Orphanides (1995) demonstrate that the diversionary conﬂict incentive is present only if a leader
is serving his ﬁrst term and fears that his domestic handling abilities
–
10
We proceed by deriving the voter and leader strategies conditional on W. In equilib–
–
rium, we treat W as endogenous. See the Appendix for a derivation of W.
11
In fact, peace does require some ﬁxed cost to maintain such as defense expenditures,
which we abstract from. Our theory focuses on conﬂict as a means whereby a leader can
signal his or her competence. It is a very important signal too, since when a country ﬁnds
itself involved in a conﬂict, it would prefer, ceteris paribus, to have a leader who is good
at keeping down the costs of conﬂict. Maintaining peace is just not a good way to signal
this characteristic since all leaders would claim that they were good at maintaining peace
and that this translates into a good ability to manage a conﬂict once it has begun. But it
is simply not veriﬁable. See also n. 9.
12
For the individual state, a is taken as given. In the following subsections, a is, of
course, endogenized as we aggregate across states.
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are such that in the absence of war, he would lose his reelection bid.
Under those circumstances, if the leader could gain reelection by demonstrating superior war-handling abilities, he may be tempted to initiate
such a potentially avoidable conﬂict. Speciﬁcally, this temptation is present if the leader’s domestic handling characteristic falls within a speciﬁc
range that depends on a, and it is described in detail in the following
subsections. The timing of events during the ﬁrst term of a newly elected
leader can be summarized as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

B.

The g of the elected leader is learned.
The leader makes the decision whether or not to seek an avoidable
war.
The country is randomly matched with a potential opponent.
The countries engage in war with probability one if the leader seeks
an avoidable war in step 2 and with probability a otherwise.
The d is learned with a war and remains uncertain otherwise.
Consumption occurs: g if there is no war, g ⫹ d if there is war. The
leader realizes rents x.
The incumbent leader is reelected or a new leader is elected.

Reelections

Three critical values for the leader’s domestic handling characteristics,
g, describe voter behavior. The largest, ĝ, deﬁnes a level of excellence
such that an incumbent with g ≥ gˆ would be reelected even with a
demonstrated inferior war-handling ability. The smallest, g, deﬁnes domestic handling so poor that at that level an incumbent with g ! g would
be voted out of ofﬁce even with a demonstrated superior war-handling
ability. In between, reelection decisions depend on both characteristics.
The critical value g ∗ deﬁnes the economic handling ability characteristic
such that incumbents with g ≥ g ∗ gain reelection if no war has taken
place and the reelection decision must be based solely on g. Starting
with g ∗, we provide a characterization of these critical values.
–
Given the expected welfare associated with a new leader, W, the reelection condition is
–
g i ⫹ ad i ≥ W(1 ⫺ v).

(4)

Incumbent is denoted with an i. Thus, in the absence of war, reelection
is ensured for any g ≥ g ∗ deﬁned as
–
¯
g ∗ { W(1 ⫺ v) ⫺ ad,

(5)
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where d̄ p ⫺pD is the expectation of d.13
Next consider the case in which the leader’s economy-handling skills
are so good that he will be reelected even if a war reveals poor warhandling ability, d p ⫺D. In this case,
–
g i ⫺ aD ≥ W(1 ⫺ v).

(6)

Using (6), we can deﬁne this “most excellent” g that ensures reelection
regardless of the leader’s war-handling ability as
–
ĝ { min {1, W(1 ⫺ v) ⫹ aD}.

(7)

If a is too high, ĝ may equal one, the best economy-handling characˆ would gain reelection in the
teristic. Note that leaders with g 苸 [g ∗, g]
absence of war but might lose if a war were to break out and an inferior
war-handling ability, d p ⫺D, were revealed. Such leaders would have
the strongest incentive to preserve peace in this framework.
While a poor war-handling ability may hurt a candidate with a good
economic handling characteristic, the revelation of a superb war-handling ability may still not salvage the reelection prospects of a leader
with a poor economic handling performance. For instance, the g such
that reelection would not occur even with the good war characteristic
satisﬁes
–
g i ! W(1 ⫺ v).

(8)

Deﬁne these “unsalvageable” candidates as those with g 苸 [0, g], where
g satisﬁes
–
g { max {0, W(1 ⫺ v)}.

(9)

Unsalvageable candidates will never engage in avoidable wars since
this does not improve their reelection prospects and lowers the public’s
expected welfare. The most relevant region in which a war may lead to
reelection but the leader would lose in the absence of war is g 苸
(g, g ∗). Whether a leader will seek to engage in war depends on the
difference between the leader’s welfare in the absence and presence of
war, V n and V w, respectively. That is,
–
V n p (1 ⫺ r)(g ⫹ vW) ⫹ rx

(10)

and
13

It is straightforward to verify that 0 ! g ∗ ! 1.
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–
–
V w p (1 ⫺ r)[g ⫺ pD ⫹ pvW ⫹ (1 ⫺ p)v(g ⫹ vW)]
⫹ r[x ⫹ (1 ⫺ p)vx].

(11)

If V n ⫺ V w p 0 has a zero in (g, g ∗), that zero will deﬁne g∗ so that the
leader engages in a potentially avoidable war if and only if g 苸
(g∗, g ∗). Otherwise, if V n ⫺ V w 1 0 for all g 苸 (g, g ∗), the leader will not
initiate war for any g and will act in accordance with the public interest.
We refer to this as the benevolent leader case. Likewise, if V n ⫺ V w ! 0
for all g 苸 (g, g ∗), the leader will initiate war whenever it can possibly
raise his probability of reelection. We refer to this as the selﬁsh leader
case.
Solving V n ⫺ V w p 0 for g yields
–
g0 p (1 ⫺ v)W ⫹

pD
(1 ⫺ p)v

⫺

rx
1⫺r

.

(12)

Then g∗ is deﬁned as
g∗ p min {max {g, g0 }, g ∗}.

(13)

From the deﬁnition of g0 and g∗, it is clear that the decision to start a
potentially avoidable war depends crucially on the leader’s selﬁshness,
r. The minimum r such that the leader behaves selﬁshly is r such that
g p g0 , namely,
r̄ p

pD
.
pD ⫹ vx(1 ⫺ p)

(14)

If r 1 r̄, then a leader will initiate a war whenever g satisﬁes g ≤ g !
g ∗. In other words, if r 1 r̄, the leader’s behavior will be indistinguishable from a totally selﬁsh leader (r p 1) such that g∗ p g. Otherwise,
if r ! r̄, then g∗ 1 g for all positive a. That r̄ is independent of a is due
to our assumption of a binary distribution for d. This convenient case
will serve as a benchmark in the investigation of equilibria below since
unless war can be supported in equilibrium when leaders act selﬁshly,
it will not be supported with partially benevolent leaders.
The unconditional probability of a leader’s reelection, P(a), is determined by the ﬁve possible regions of g outlined above. Leaders with
g 苸 [0, g) have a zero probability of reelection, those with g 苸 [g, g∗)
have reelection probability a(1 ⫺ p), those with g 苸 [g∗, g ∗) have reeˆ have reelection problection probability (1 ⫺ p), those with g 苸 [g ∗, g)
ˆ 1] have a reelection
ability (1 ⫺ a) ⫹ a(1 ⫺ p), and those with g 苸 [g,
probability of one. When g is uniformly distributed over the unit interval, the unconditional probability of a leader’s reelection is
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P(a) p (g∗ ⫺ g)a(1 ⫺ p) ⫹ (g ∗ ⫺ g∗)(1 ⫺ p)
ˆ
⫹ (gˆ ⫺ g ∗)(1 ⫺ ap) ⫹ (1 ⫺ g),

(15)

∗

ˆ g, and g∗ are deﬁned in expressions (5), (7), (9), and (13),
where g , g,
respectively.
C.

The Supply of Potentially Avoidable War

Given a, we have already determined the probability with which a new
leader would initiate a potentially avoidable war:
b(a) p G(g ∗) ⫺ G(g∗) p g ∗ ⫺ g∗.

(16)

We have also determined the probability with which a new leader would
gain reelection, P(a). In this subsection, we use b(a) and P(a) to
determine the expected frequency with which a state will have a leader
facing the temptation of war, that is, ﬁrst-term governments with poor
economic records that have not already had their war-handling characteristics revealed. We call this fraction j(a), to denote the supply of
conﬂict.
First, we determine the frequency with which a state has a ﬁrst-term
leader. Let Fj denote that a leader is in his ﬁrst term at time period j
and 1 ⫺ Fj denote that a leader is not in his ﬁrst term at period j (i.e.,
is in his last term). Consider the Markov process describing whether a
state has a leader who is in his ﬁrst term. If a leader is currently serving
his ﬁrst term, the probability with which a leader will be serving his ﬁrst
term in the subsequent period is 1 ⫺ P(a) p Pr (Ft⫹1FF).
If the current
t
leader is not serving his ﬁrst term, since leaders may serve only up to
two terms, this leader may not be reelected. Therefore, in this case, the
probability with which a leader will be serving his ﬁrst term in the
subsequent period is one, that is, Pr (Ft⫹1F1 ⫺ F)
t p 1. Thus the transition
probability matrix indicating the term served by a state’s leader is
Pr (1 ⫺ F FF)
(PrPr(F(FF1FF)
⫺ F) Pr (1 ⫺ F F1 ⫺ F))
1 ⫺ P(a) P(a)
p(
.
1
0 )

Pp

t⫹1

t⫹1

t

t⫹1

t

t⫹1

t

t

(17)

With this we can compute the unconditional frequency or stationary
probability with which a leader will be serving a ﬁrst term:
f(a) p

1
1 ⫹ P(a)

.

(18)

Since only ﬁrst-term leaders succumb to the temptation of war and of

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.75 on Fri, 30 Nov 2012 15:12:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

war and democracy

789

these ﬁrst-term leaders they face this temptation only with probability
b, the frequency with which a state’s leader will contribute to the supply
of war is
j(a) p b(a)f(a).

D.

(19)

Equilibrium

To describe the equilibrium outcome for the world, we assume that the
world consists of a countable inﬁnity of essentially identical states all of
which are characterized by the properties described above for an individual state. We assume that the leaders’ characteristics, g and d, are
drawn independently from state to state, and, consequently, the probabilities of reelection and temptation of war supply for one state are
also independent of those for another, with a state’s probability of facing
unavoidable war, a, always taken as given. Consequently, application of
the law of large numbers implies that the stationary probability of the
supply of war for an individual state will equal the measure of states
that will seek to supply war in any given period (see Feldman and Gilles
1985). That is, the fraction of states that will initiate potentially avoidable
conﬂict in every period will be j(a). The uncertainty at the individual
state level regarding the reelection of a leader and his propensity to
seek a potentially avoidable conﬂict disappears in the aggregate.
To characterize the frequency of war equilibria, it needs to be recognized that when a state seeks to enter in a potentially avoidable conﬂict, it will require being matched with another state with which the
conﬂict presumably has arisen. And unless the other state involved in
the conﬂict was also actively seeking to engage in a potentially avoidable
war, this conﬂict will appear unavoidable to that state. That is, one state’s
avoidable conﬂict may well be another state’s unavoidable one.
The equilibrium condition describing the probability with which a
state not seeking war may be forced into a conﬂict if a fraction j of
states seek conﬂict is now determined. Denote the states seeking to
initiate conﬂict as “seekers” and those that would rather avoid it as
“avoiders.” Hence, with a fraction j of seekers, the measure of avoiders
in the world equals 1 ⫺ j.
Now, by deﬁnition, a is the probability that a war avoider country is
engaged into a conﬂict by a war seeker. In determining the equilibrium
condition linking a and j, we need to specify the propensity with which
seekers engage avoiders in conﬂict. For instance, if seekers somehow
were to be matched only with other seekers, then the measure of avoiders engaged in conﬂict, a, would equal zero, no matter how large j
happened to be. More generally, suppose that each seeker is matched
with an avoider with probability q and with another seeker with prob-
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ability 1 ⫺ q. Then the qj measure of seeker states will engage in conﬂict
with states among the 1 ⫺ j measure of avoider states. Thus the probability of unavoidable war that an avoider state faces is
ap

qj
1⫺j

p {fraction of avoiders matched with a seeker}.

(20)

As already alluded to, if q p 0, then avoiders are never attacked;
hence, there is no fear of unavoidable war, namely a p 0. At the other
extreme, if seeker states were always matched with avoider states, then
q p 1 and the equilibrium condition would be a p j/(1 ⫺ j).
Since countries are assumed to be ex ante identical, our benchmark
matching assumption is that avoider and seeker states are randomly
matched. That is, for our equilibrium condition, we assume that the
probability with which a seeker state is matched with an avoider state,
q, equals the fraction of avoider states in the world, 1 ⫺ j. Then q p
1 ⫺ j and the equilibrium condition becomes
a p j.

(21)

With this equilibrium condition, a worldwide equilibrium of the frequency of war can easily be characterized as a pair {a, j} that satisﬁes
the supply of war (19) and the equilibrium condition (21).14
III.

Characterization of War Equilibria

Equations (19) and (21) form the basis of determining equilibria in
our model with just democracies. Equation (19) is the individual country’s probability of generating an avoidable war. This traces out, for a
given probability of unavoidable war, the incentive-compatible probability of starting an avoidable one. Equation (21) is the general equilibrium condition that reﬂects that since one state’s unavoidable war is
another state’s avoidable one, the two types of war must “add up” across
states.
A.

Existence

In this subsection we establish that Kant’s idealistic equilibrium of perpetual peace always exists but that other equilibria with positive war
frequency may also prevail.
Proposition 1. The Kant equilibrium.— a p 0 is always an equilibrium.
All proofs are in the Appendix. Our ﬁrst result is that Kant’s equilibrium is feasible; that is, a world populated only by democracies can
–
14
As stated earlier, the equations for a and j need to be compatible with W. We explicitly
calculate this in the Appendix.
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sustain perpetual peace. As long as there is no external threat of war,
voters will not be interested in a leader’s war-handling abilities; therefore, leaders will not seek conﬂicts to try to salvage their reelection
prospects. The voters are simply not interested in this characteristic of
a leader, and, in equilibrium, their disinterest in war-handling skills is
self-reinforcing since no wars occur. Hence, in a world in which there
is no good reason for war, Kant’s perpetual peace is indeed possible.
However, while perpetual peace with democracy is shown to be feasible, it may not be the only feasible outcome and may not be stable.
We turn to these issues next. First, we show that if leaders act as though
they are completely selﬁsh, r 1 r̄, a war equilibrium may also be feasible.
A central issue for this is the informational beneﬁt to the electorate
associated with the revelation of superior war-handling ability. Intuitively,
if the incidence of war is not expected to be costly regardless of the
leader’s ability, the electorate will rationally put much less emphasis on
war-handling abilities when considering reelection. Consequently, the
beneﬁt associated with forcing the revelation of war-handling ability is
severely diminished, even for leaders who possess complete selﬁshness
(r r 1). This diminishes the frequency of avoidable war supply and
precludes the sustainability of positive war equilibria. A central question,
therefore, is whether positive war equilibria exist if war is expected to
be sufﬁciently costly. The following condition is sufﬁcient to guarantee
multiple equilibria (see the Appendix for the derivation):
lim
ar0

dj
da

p

pDv
⫺1 ⫹ v ⫹ 冑1 ⫹ v

1 1.

(22)

The following proposition summarizes our central war equilibrium
result.
Proposition 2. War equilibrium existence.—If r 1 r̄ and pD is sufﬁciently
high to satisfy (22), then an equilibrium with a positive frequency of
war exists.
The war equilibrium demonstrated in proposition 2 is shown in ﬁgure
1. The probability of unavoidable war, a, is measured on the horizontal
axis and the supply of unavoidable war, j(a), is measured on the vertical
axis. The equilibrium condition, expression (21), is represented by the
line drawn through the origin, which has a slope of one. If the expected
costs of war are sufﬁciently high (i.e., pD is large), then dj/da is greater
than one when evaluated as a r 0, which coupled with the continuity
of the supply schedule provides the multiple equilibria. This is demonstrated by the supply of war schedule labeled j1(a). By contrast, if
the cost of war is not high enough, then the supply of war schedule
falls below the equilibrium schedule as demonstrated with j0(a). Then
Kant’s idealistic equilibrium is the unique equilibrium.
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Fig. 1.—Multiplicity of war equilibria. The ﬁgure shows the equilibrium condition for
war, j p a, and two supply schedules derived under the assumption that leader selﬁshness,
¯ The lower line, j0(a), indicates the supply schedule when war costs are
r, exceeds r.
benign. In this case, a p j p 0 is the unique equilibrium of the model. The upper line,
j1(a), indicates the supply schedule when war costs are high. Point A indicates the resulting
positive equilibrium of the frequency of war.

The preceding analysis is predicated on the selﬁshness of democratic
leaders. Next, we examine the possibility of multiple equilibria when
leaders are partially benevolent. Assume that the multiplicity condition
(22) is satisﬁed so that, if r 1 r̄, the positive war equilibrium is known
to exist. Then we get the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Partial benevolence.—There exists r ! r̄ such that multiple war equilibria exist only if r ≥ r. Further, for some r 苸 [r, r̄),
multiple equilibria with a positive frequency of war exist.
Figure 2 presents the essential elements of the model’s equilibria
when r ! r̄ and the expected costs of war are still high enough that
dj/da 1 1 for some a. The variables on both axes are the same as those
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Fig. 2.—Leader benevolence and multiple war equilibria. The ﬁgure shows the equilibrium condition for war, j p a, and three supply schedules corresponding to different
degrees of leader benevolence. The upper schedule, j1(a), is redrawn from ﬁg. 1 and
¯ The lower line, j3(a), shows
indicates the case equivalent to complete selﬁshness, r 1 r.
a case with leaders sufﬁciently benevolent, r ! r, that only the perpetual peace equilibrium,
a p j p 0, is supported. The intermediate case, j2(a), exhibits three equilibria, with two,
B and C, having a positive frequency of war.

in ﬁgure 1, and the equilibrium condition is unchanged. There are two
important cases to consider when r ! r̄. The ﬁrst is the case in which
r ! r ! r̄. As r ! r̄ implies that g∗ 1 g, this means that, for any level of
a, fewer governments will seek out conﬂict and there will be a reduced
supply of war. That is, the supply of war schedule falls everywhere below
the one corresponding to the case of complete selﬁshness, r ≥ r̄. Furthermore, for a range of a in the neighborhood of a p 0, the supply
of avoidable war will remain zero because of the benevolence of incumbent leaders. When a is very small, benevolent leaders recognize that
the welfare cost of war is too large relative to the beneﬁt of demon-
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strating a potentially superior war-handling ability. Hence they do not
initiate avoidable wars. The information value of war increases with a,
however, and for sufﬁciently high values the beneﬁt of knowing d becomes large enough for leaders to be tempted to initiate such wars. The
result is illustrated in ﬁgure 2 as the supply schedule j2(a). Compared
to j1(a), the partial benevolence case of r ! r ! r̄ exhibits three steady
states. With greater benevolence, r ! r, the supply of war drops further
and the multiplicity eventually vanishes, as illustrated with the supply
schedule j3(a).15
B.

Stability

We now turn our attention to the stability properties of the war equilibria
examined above. Let â be an equilibrium. To examine the local stability
of an equilibrium â, it sufﬁces to investigate whether the frequency of
the supply of war will tend to restore the equilibrium if the actual
frequency of war observed in the most recent period and the expected
frequency of war in future periods converge to the steady state, â.16
Our ﬁrst stability result concerns the equilibria described in proposition 2, which obtain in the selﬁsh leader case, r 1 r̄.
Proposition 4. Instability of peace with selﬁshness.—If r 1 r̄ and the
multiplicity condition (22) is satisﬁed, the Kant equilibrium is unstable.
That is, with sufﬁciently selﬁsh leaders, the existence of the positive
frequency of war equilibria described in proposition 2 implies that the
idealistic equilibrium is unstable. This startling result follows directly
from the observation that the multiplicity condition we employ in proposition 2 is complementary to the condition for stability for the perpetual
peace equilibrium. Hence when r 1 r̄ and the multiplicity condition
holds, the Kant equilibrium is unstable! We now turn to the case of
multiple equilibria with partial benevolence, r ! r ! r̄.
Proposition 5. Stability of peace with partial benevolence.—If r ! r ! r̄,
then both the Kant equilibrium and a positive war equilibrium are stable.
Returning to ﬁgure 2, recall that with partial benevolence there are
multiple equilibria with a positive frequency of war in addition to the
idealistic/Kant equilibrium. As the supply of war is continuous in a and
ˆ da ! 1. Furthersince j(1) ! 1, the largest aˆ must be such that dj(a)/
more, since b(a) p 0 for a neighborhood near the origin, a p 0 is also
locally stable. Accordingly, in a world populated solely by democracies,
15
There is also, of course, the knife-edge case r p r.
¯ Then j(a) is tangent to the
equilibrium, for some â 1 0, in which case there are just two equilibria, a p 0 and a p
â. Also, we do not establish that the multiplicity obtains for all r 苸 (r, r).
¯ Possibly, multiplicity obtains in disconnected intervals in (r, r).
¯
16
That is, our notion of stability is that of asymptotic stability. See Weibull (1995) for
a discussion.
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one stable outcome is such that perpetual peace prevails in equilibrium.
However, there are also other stable outcomes in which peace does not
prevail.
IV.

Appropriative Wars and Nondemocratic Regimes

The prior section investigated the signaling role of diversionary wars in
a world populated with just democracies. Understanding this important
limiting case now allows us to examine the equilibrium frequencies of
war that allow for two additional elements of realism. First, in addition
to the presence of diversionary conﬂicts examined thus far, which are
never beneﬁcial for the citizens of a democracy, there may exist other
wars that are appropriative in nature and potentially welfare-improving.
Second, the world is not populated solely by democratic governments.
Below we consider the role of appropriative wars and nondemocratic
governments in the determination of the worldwide frequency of war
and examine whether a more democratic world is necessarily more
peaceful.
A.

Appropriative Wars and Democracy

To introduce the role of appropriative wars, we assume that there are
occasions in which a government—independent of regime—is presented with an attractive opportunity for starting an appropriative conﬂict. With probability w, in every period, the leader of a state realizes
an opportunity for such an appropriative war. These conﬂicts differ from
the ones we examined thus far in that they present an additional net
beneﬁt to the state equal to e per person.
Thus, if the leader engages in such a war, the consumption of each
individual citizen for that period changes from equation (1) to ct p
gt ⫹ dt ⫹ e. For simplicity, we assume that the probability of being presented with an opportunity for an appropriative conﬂict, w, is independent over time, leader characteristics, leaders, and countries. Further,
the presence of such opportunities is perfectly clear to both leaders and
citizens, and the appropriation beneﬁts, e, are known.
The relevant question for our purposes is under what circumstances
a democratic leader would seize an opportunity for an appropriative
war. The answer depends critically on the size of e and can be easily
classiﬁed in two cases. One case obtains if the spoils from appropriative
wars are so large that it would make such conﬂicts beneﬁcial even for
states whose leaders are not proved to be competent at war. This case
is not interesting from the perspective of whether Kant’s perpetual peace
can be supported in equilibrium. By assuming the presence of welfareimproving wars, this scenario generates a positive frequency of war in
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equilibrium regardless of any other conditions, which would necessarily
rule out Kant’s perpetual peace.17
The second case obtains if appropriative war is beneﬁcial only if the
state is led to war by a democratic leader with demonstrated war-handling competence. We concentrate our attention on this case. Clearly,
if a leader knows that his war-handling characteristic is d p 0, it will be
to the beneﬁt of the state to engage in such a conﬂict. Thus appropriative conﬂicts will be initiated by leaders who are presented with such
an opportunity after they have already been engaged in a conﬂict that
revealed their superior war-handling skills. The overall frequency with
which a democratic state will contribute to the supply of war in this case
is then
j D(a) p b(a)f(a) ⫹ wz(a),

(23)

where z(a) ≥ 0 is the frequency of leaders who are currently serving
their second term and have war experience from their ﬁrst term that
revealed a good war-handling ability. Here, of course, the ﬁrst term on
the right-hand side of equation (23) continues to describe the diversionary motive as in equation (19). The second term is equal to the
additional supply due to appropriative wars and has a number of interesting features. If a p 0, then the supply of appropriative war is also
zero, z(0) p 0. Recall that unless a state engages in a conﬂict, its leader
cannot ascertain his war-handling abilities. Thus, unless some leaders
are engaged in unavoidable conﬂicts during their ﬁrst term, no leaders
will have the war experience that might lead them into appropriative
conﬂicts during their second terms. On the other hand, if a 1 0, some
leaders will discover their superior handling skills during their ﬁrst term
and subsequently take advantage of the appropriative opportunities they
might be presented with in their second term. Thus, for a 1 0, appropriative war supply by democracies is positive. However, the supply of
appropriative war for democracies is always strictly less than w, regardless
of a. This can be seen by noting the following. First, fewer than half of
all leaders are in their second term in any period. Second, of these
second-term leaders, not all will have prior war experience, let alone
one that revealed a good war-handling ability.
A graphical illustration of the supply of war in the presence of a motive
17
For example, consider the case in which e is so large that dt ⫹ e 1 0, regardless of the
value of the leader’s war-handling ability, dt. In this case, since the war always yields net
beneﬁts, the supply of war is bounded below by w and perpetual peace is no longer an
equilibrium. In another case, e is not large enough to outweigh the cost of war for incompetent military leaders, d p ⫺D, but is larger than the expected cost to be incurred
by a leader of uncertain competence, ⫺pD, i.e., e 苸 (pD, D). Again, for some ﬁrst- and
second-term leaders, this will be a sufﬁciently strong incentive for them to start an appropriative war, regardless of the value of a. Consequently, perpetual peace will never be
an equilibrium.
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Fig. 3.—Effect of appropriative wars. The ﬁgure illustrates the effect of appropriative
conﬂicts on the supply of war with selﬁsh democratic leaders. The baseline case with no
appropriative motive corresponds to j1(a). With an appropriative motive, the supply rotates
to j4(a) with a new positive war equilibrium at point D.

for appropriation is shown in ﬁgure 3. Essentially, appropriative conﬂicts
rotate the supply schedule of war in a democratic world counterclockwise from the supply schedule j1 when w p 0 to the new schedule j4
when w 1 0. It is worth noting that even though the appropriative motive
we introduce is not strong enough to eliminate the Kant equilibrium,
its presence reinforces the possibility that positive war equilibria will
exist.
B.

Nondemocratic Regimes

Next, we consider the frequency of war under nondemocratic regimes
in order to provide some comparisons with our democratic world benchmark. To keep the analysis simple, we assume that nondemocratic gov-
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ernments face a constant probability of remaining in ofﬁce an additional
period, independent of their economic and war-handling abilities. This
implies that nondemocratic leaders will have no incentive to, and therefore will not, engage in diversionary wars such as the avoidable conﬂicts
some democratic leaders may engage in to increase the probability of
their political survival. Gelpi (1997) provides supporting evidence for
this claim. He ﬁnds that, in fact, democracies are more prone to use
diversionary international uses of force to externalize weak domestic
support than authoritarian regimes. In contrast, he argues that authoritarian regimes tend not to externalize their domestic political problems
but rather directly suppress domestic discontent via the military. In
addition, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999b) also ﬁnd that the length of
ofﬁce holding and the inﬂuence of adverse economic conditions are
empirically quite different between democratic and nondemocratic regimes. First, they report that over the past 200 years the average duration
of ofﬁce holding by an autocrat is 20.7 years, whereas that for democratic
leaders is 5.7 years. Second, and more central, they ﬁnd that although
an economic contraction increases by 50 percent the risk that a democratic leader will be removed from ofﬁce, it actually reduces the risk
that a nondemocratic leader will be turned out of ofﬁce.18 Therefore,
the evidence suggests that nondemocratic regimes have little motivation
to contribute directly to the supply of diversionary conﬂicts.
Nondemocracies, however, are not bashful at engaging in appropriative conﬂicts. In fact, a fundamental difference between democracies
and nondemocracies often entails the way in which the net beneﬁts
from appropriative conﬂicts are shared between leaders and citizens.
As we noted earlier, Kant had noted this as quite important for understanding why perpetual peace cannot materialize in a nondemocratic
world. Robbins (1940) and Snyder (1991) also suggest that appropriation provides a motive for war to leaders of nondemocratic/illiberal
countries but not to democratic/liberal ones.
To capture this asymmetry in a simple manner, we assume that the
leader (and presumably the ruling elite that maintains his power base)
usurps the beneﬁts of appropriative wars e, but does not incur the costs
d, which are borne by the people of the state. Under these simplifying
assumptions, it becomes evident that a nondemocracy will start a war
18
In another paper, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1998) provide a theoretical explanation
for this intriguing ﬁnding. They argue that the greater number of people who have an
institutional say in selecting leaders (selectors) vs. the number of individuals the leader
needs to stay in ofﬁce (winners) will induce a norm of loyalty among selectors to the
ofﬁce holder since they fear being excluded from future ruling coalitions. Hence, leaders
will exploit this and reduce their effort at producing goods that the public will enjoy.
Accordingly, terrible economic performance can be sustained by nondemocracies since
they have a small equilibrium ratio of winners to selectors, unlike democracies that have
a large equilibrium fraction of winners to selectors.
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whenever its leader is presented with an appropriative opportunity. That
is, the supply of war by a nondemocracy, on average, is j N p w. From
this it is evident that if all countries were nondemocracies, then the
equilibrium frequency of war would be exactly w.
Note that the underlying net beneﬁt to the country from an appropriative conﬂict, e, is the same regardless of regime type. However, the
distribution within a country of the beneﬁts and costs of an appropriative
war depends on regime type. This asymmetry will affect the propensity
with which the two types of regimes start appropriative conﬂicts. Since
all nondemocratic leaders will seize the opportunity to start an appropriative conﬂict and not all democratic leaders will, the supply of appropriative conﬂicts will always be greater for nondemocratic regimes
than for democratic ones.
C.

Peace in a More Democratic World?

The remaining question of interest is whether in a world populated by
both democracies and nondemocracies, the frequency of war will be
smaller when the fraction of democracies is larger. If both democratic
and nondemocratic states coexist with fractions l and 1 ⫺ l, respectively,
then the total world supply of war is
j W(a) p lj D(a) ⫹ (1 ⫺ l)j N,

(24)

where j (a) is presented in equation (23) and j p w.
To understand whether a more democratic world is more peaceful,
we shall again concentrate our attention on the case of selﬁsh democratic leaders, r 1 r̄, when the positive war equilibrium exists if the world
is completely democratic. Then, when l p 1, the supply of war is j4, as
shown in ﬁgure 3, which is now redrawn as jD in ﬁgure 4. If all countries
are democratic, we have, of course, the Kant equilibrium and also the
positive war equilibrium, with frequency of war equal to j̄ D. If all countries are nondemocratic, the supply of war is j N p w. Since the global
supply of war is a weighted average of the two, the key for determining
whether the global frequency of war falls or rises with increased democratization depends on whether j̄ D is greater or smaller than w. Depending on the relative propensity for diversionary wars and appropriative opportunities, both cases are possible in our model.
To see this, consider the two limiting cases for the frequency of appropriative opportunities, w. As w r 0, the diversionary motive for democracies becomes the only source of conﬂict, so surely increased democratization raises the frequency of war. On the other hand, since not
all democratic leaders initiate war when presented with an appropriative
opportunity whereas all nondemocratic leaders do, if w were to approach
one, the supply of appropriative conﬂict by nondemocracies would beD

N
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Fig. 4.—Global equilibrium with partial democracy. The supply schedules jD (redrawn
from j4 in ﬁg. 3) and j N p w denote the global supply of war when either all countries
are democratic or all countries are nondemocratic. The dashed line, jW, indicates the
global war supply when a fraction of all countries is democratic and another fraction is
not. The resulting global equilibrium is at point W. The ﬁgure is drawn such that w 1
j̄ D (case I), so greater democratization reduces the frequency of war.

come the dominant source of war. Thus, given other parameters in the
model, if w is sufﬁciently large, we shall have w 1 j¯ D (case I); if w is
sufﬁciently small, we shall have w ! j¯ D (case II).
In ﬁgure 4, we illustrate the global equilibrium for case I, w 1 j¯ D. In
this case, a completely nondemocratic world, l p 0, will have the highest frequency of war, shown as point N in the ﬁgure. With l 苸 (0, 1),
the global war supply, shown as jW, will fall between jN and jD, with the
equilibrium shown as point W. In this case, increased democratization
will indeed reduce the equilibrium frequency of conﬂict. In case II,
however, with w ! j¯ D, this would not obtain. An additional noteworthy
feature that obtains in both cases is that in a partially democratic world,
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perpetual peace is not an equilibrium, a characteristic that accords well
with historical observation. Only in the limit, as l p 1, does the Kant
equilibrium exist.19

V.

Norms and Institutions

The model has so far established the existence and stability of equilibria
characterized by perpetual peace and those with a positive frequency
of war. While these results are helpful to understand the dynamics and
incentives for voters and leaders within individual countries as well as
in the aggregate, other factors may also inﬂuence the selection of the
Kant equilibrium in the model, provided that multiple equilibria exist.
Below we consider the impact of norms and institutions on the model’s
equilibria.20
As pointed to in proposition 4, when leaders are selﬁsh, the no-war
equilibrium is unstable. This stability result, however, is based on a system of rational expectations whereby voters and leaders can ﬂexibly
alter their expectations about the probability of conﬂict. Assume that
the world begins at this idealistic/Kant equilibrium and that the norm
is that peace is to prevail perpetually. Here we consider a norm as being
a rigid or sticky expectation regarding world behavior, which would not
immediately change in light of unexpected but transient events. If countries were then to observe a one-time incident of war, a norm regarding
the peaceful resolution of disputes would provide a coordination device
such that if all the countries believed that it was a one-time incident
and continued to believe that the future probability of war was zero,
then the idealistic/Kant equilibrium could still continue to be supported. Thus, if democratic countries adopt a norm that disputes will
be solved without resort to violence, then these rather inﬂexible expectations may provide the necessary stability to the “instability” of the
no-war equilibrium established in proposition 4.
Another way to sustain the democratic peace would be to alter the
domestic institutional framework underlying foreign policy decisions so
as to involve voters directly, namely, to decentralize the decision-making
process for war decisions more along the lines of a republic (i.e., a
19
The case of partially selﬁsh leaders is more complicated but delivers a conclusion
similar to that described for selﬁsh leaders when the world is partially democratic. One
interesting difference is that multiple equilibria can be constructed even if l ! 1 instead
of just the limit case l p 1.
20
It is important to note that we do not claim to endogenize these norms and institutions
but merely explore what their inﬂuence would be on the equilibria we have identiﬁed
through our model.
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direct democracy).21 Unfortunately, the fundamental character of the
foreign policy decision-making process makes it likely that a representative democracy may be all that we can hope for in terms of domestic
institutions. Private information, the complexity of foreign policy decisions, and the added time lag involved in decentralized decisions (e.g.,
voting on speciﬁc foreign policy issues) largely make a republic unattainable. This is consistent with Tocqueville’s ([1835] 1981) classic remark that “foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which
are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect
use of almost all those in which it is deﬁcient” (p. 552).
However, while altering domestic institutions may not be a feasible
way of supporting an idealistic/Kant equilibrium, the creation of institutions between nations is more likely to bring about the Pareto-optimal
equilibrium.22 More speciﬁcally, consider the existence of a credible
institution such that a fraction of countries, m, form an alliance with a
threat to retaliate against a country with certainty if any member is
attacked.23 To demonstrate that in a world with just democracies a credible alliance is effective in stopping the threat of wars for members of
the alliance from nonallied democratic government, consider the following. If a democratic leader who seeks war attacks a country inside
the alliance, his probability of war next period is one; if he attacks a
country outside the alliance, it is only a. Hence, a war seeker will not
attack coalition countries but only noncoalition countries, so that if the
alliance is credible, the probability of war will be zero for members.
The observed implication of this form of alliance in which there are
insiders and outsiders is that if the alliance is credible, the no-war equilibrium will prevail for the members of the alliance: an outsider would
rather attack an outsider than an insider. For countries outside the
alliance, however, there will be no change in the international environment since there will still be seeker and avoider states in the same relative
proportion as when we considered the entire world without alliances.
When we aggregate across insiders and outsiders, the world will have a
ˆ ⫺ m), with the alliance versus aˆ without the
lower frequency of war, a(1
alliance. The reduction in the frequency of conﬂict is entirely due to
21
This point is brought out in Hess and Orphanides (1995). In a recent paper, Persson,
Roland, and Tabellini (1997) formally examine the beneﬁts of the separation of powers
for political accountability.
22
It has been pointed out by both Kant (1795) and Tocqueville (1835) that democracies
would be more inclined to form alliances and thereby bring about a world with fewer
wars—essentially creating a “separate peace.” It is interesting to note that Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) report that nondemocratic allies are more likely to ﬁght each
other than if they were not allies.
23
We assume that the alliance is such that its members do not attack one another, there
is no free riding, and the alliance contractually obligates the countries to retaliate. For a
general discussion of alliances, see, among others, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992),
Russett (1993), and Smith (1995).
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the reduction of conﬂict for alliance members.24 The impact of alliances
on the propensity for conﬂict also holds when there are nondemocracies. If, as suggested by Kant (1795) and Tocqueville (1835), democracies
are more inclined to form and join alliances, then nondemocracies will
tend to engage in appropriative conﬂicts only with each other.
The reduced frequency of conﬂict for countries within an alliance
can naturally lead to a situation in which all countries would want to
belong to a credible coalition, such as has been attempted in the twentieth century with the formation of the League of Nations and the
United Nations. An all-inclusive organization that credibly maintained
the standard of protecting its democratic members would again bring
the world toward the perpetual peace. Of course, the maintenance and
origination of this type of institution would rely fundamentally on the
organization’s credibility, its incentive structure to reduce free riding
on the public creation of peace, and so forth. These issues, while important, are unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper.25
Finally, while international institutions that encourage the peaceful
resolution of disputes may bring about the democratic peace, so may
international institutions that emphasize free trade and economic interdependence between nations. While economists do not typically list
peace as one of the primary beneﬁts of trade, the value of economic
integration in this context should not be discounted. As Keynes (1920)
pointed out at the close of the First World War, “A Free Trade Union,
comprising the whole of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe,
Siberia, Turkey, and (I should hope) the United Kingdom, Egypt and
India, might do as much for the peace and prosperity of the world as
the League of Nations itself” (p. 249).26 Empirical support for the compounding effect that democracy and economic interdependence have
on reducing the probability of conﬂict and crises between nations has
been recently demonstrated in Oneal et al. (1996) and Oneal and Russett (1997).
24
Notice that this does not eliminate a positive frequency of war equilibrium but merely
translates it to one with a proportionally smaller frequency of war.
25
A further enhancement to peace would be the international enforcement of a oneterm presidency. An individual state would not be willing to adopt this limitation on its
own, given that others did not, since it would not lower its overall probability of war and
it would not be able to retain leaders that it would prefer. Again, the design of optimal
constitutions is beyond the scope of this paper.
26
Oneal and Russett (1997) state that, on the basis of a late twentieth-century interpretation of his argument for “cosmopolitan law” as an ingredient for the perpetual peace,
Kant also recognized this point. Howard (1978) points to the seventeenth-century French
monk Emeric Crucé as one of the ﬁrst scholars to point to feedback from peace to free
trade to further enhancements of peace. Howard also points to similar arguments made
by Thomas Paine, Adam Smith, and John Stuart Mill.
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Conclusion

This paper theoretically analyzes two key questions: Will a fully democratic world necessarily bring about a perpetual peace as Kant (1795)
hypothesized, and will a more democratic world necessarily be more
peaceful? To answer the ﬁrst question, we present a general equilibrium
model of conﬂict based on a world populated by representative democracies. On the basis of the rational voter, partial equilibrium approach developed in Hess and Orphanides (1995), an individual country
takes as given the probability of unavoidable conﬂict. An incumbent
leader may initiate an avoidable conﬂict if doing so rationally diverts
the electorate’s attention from his inferior domestic handling of the
economy toward the possibility that he may be good at handling foreign
conﬂict. As a result, democratic states may be responsible for at least
some foreign conﬂict. We endogenize the probability that a country
faces an unavoidable conﬂict and examine whether war persists in equilibrium. In doing so, we explore the conditions under which a world
with democracies will have no war and the extent to which this peace
can be perpetually sustained.
Finally, building on our analysis of the Kant hypothesis, we demonstrate that a more democratic world will not necessarily be more peaceful. The outcome depends on the relative propensity for democratic
countries to generate diversionary wars and the frequency with which
opportunities for appropriative war are exploited by democratic and
nondemocratic leaders. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the norms associated
with the peaceful resolution of disputes and the presence of credible
international institutions can have an important inﬂuence in the overall
equilibrium and thus be crucial factors for the sustainability of perpetual
peace.
While this paper has examined only conﬂict between states, conﬂict
within states may be inﬂuenced by similar factors. Grossman (1991)
provides a general equilibrium model of insurrections within a country
to which factors such as the ones we highlight could be investigated.
This also relates to the number and size of states that in our model we
take as exogenous. Recently, Alesina and Spolaore (1996, 1997) have
created an economic model of “secession.” Two ﬁndings of theirs, which
are particularly relevant to our work, are that the process of democratization can lead to an increase in “secessions” and that a decreased
probability of international conﬂict actually increases the number of
secessions. While Alesina and Spolaore consider only “democratic” secessions, their emphasis on the endogeneity of the size of states is particularly important since not all breakups are peaceful. This type of
intranational conﬂict would be an additional avenue that will affect the
likelihood that a world populated by just democracies can generate a
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perpetual peace. While these aspects of conﬂict are not incorporated
into our model, they would likely reinforce the likelihood of positive
equilibria of the frequency of war. Maintaining a democratic perpetual
peace, then, will be most likely only with increased international integration and coordination.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
If a p 0, then by equations (5), (9), and (13), g p g∗ p g ∗. Therefore, from
their deﬁnitions, b p j p 0. Thus a p j p 0 is an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2
A positive war equilibrium is an equilibrium such that j(a) p a for positive
values of a. To evaluate such equilibria, we ﬁrst need to solve for the equilibrium
of the problem in
construct the equilibrium, we need to ﬁnd
– terms of a. To
ˆ g, and g ∗ as functions of a. The solution will satisfy
the solutions to W, g,
–
equations (5), (7), and (9) and also the implicit equation for W, which is deﬁned
as the unconditional expectation of a leader of characteristic g. For our purposes
it sufﬁces to ﬁnd the solution as a r 0. This is convenient because in that case,
as can be seen from equations (7) and (9), as a r 0, gˆ and g are in the interior
of (0, 1) and in the limit equal g ∗. Hence, for small a the relevant equations
become
–
g p W(1 ⫺ v) p g ∗ ⫺ apD
and
–
ĝ p W(1 ⫺ v) ⫹ aD p g ∗ ⫹ a(1 ⫺ p)D.
ˆ Since r 1 r,
ˆ however, g0 ! g and therefore by (13)
Note that g ≤ g∗ ≤ g ∗ ≤ g.
g∗ p g. Consequently, when a is small so that gˆ and g are in the interior, we
can express g and –
gˆ in terms of just g ∗ and characterize the equilibrium by
∗
solving for g and W.
–
To construct the equation for W, we ﬁrst need to deﬁne the welfare value of
the public associated with alternative g as follows: For g 苸 [0, g) such that there
is a sure loss with and without war,
–
W 1 p g ⫺ apD ⫹ vW.
For g 苸 [g, g ∗), such that choosing avoidable war leads to reelection with
(1 ⫺ p),
–
–
W 2 p g ⫺ pD ⫹ pvW ⫹ (1 ⫺ p)v(g ⫹ vW).
ˆ unavoidable war leads to reelection with (1 ⫺ p):
For g 苸 [g ∗, g),
–
–
–
W 3 p g ⫺ apD ⫹ apvW ⫹ a(1 ⫺ p)v(g ⫹ vW) ⫹ (1 ⫺ a)v(g ⫺ apD ⫹ vW).
ˆ 1], the leader is sure of reelection even with war:
And ﬁnally, for g 苸 [g,
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–
W 4 p g ⫺ apD ⫹ v(g ⫺ apD ⫹ vW).

Integrating over the appropriate regions of g, we get
–
Wp

冕

冕

g∗

g

W dG ⫹
1

g

0

冕

gˆ

W dG ⫹
2

g∗

冕

1

W 3dG ⫹

W 4dG,

gˆ

which together with
–
g ∗ p W(1 ⫺ v) ⫹ apD
characterizes the equilibrium. Notice that since the distribution G is uniform,
the integration in the equation above will provide a quadratic equation in g ∗.
Only one of the two solutions, however, is feasible, which yields the equilibrium

冑
– 1 ⫹ v ⫺ aDpv ⫺ X
Wp
,
v(1 ⫺ v)
where
X p 1 ⫹ v ⫹ 2aD 2p 2 v ⫺ 2a 2D 2p 2 v ⫺ a 3D 2pv 2 ⫺ a 2D 2p 2 v 2
⫹ 2a 3D 2p 2 v 2 ⫹ a 2D 2p 3 v 2 ⫺ a 3D 2p 3 v 2.
With the solution at hand, using equations (16), (18), and (19), we determine
the equilibrium j as a function of a. Differentiation with respect to a and
evaluation of the derivative in the limit yields
dj(a)
pDv
p
.
da
ar0
⫺1 ⫹ v ⫹ 冑1 ⫹ v

lim

Notice that for sufﬁciently
high pD, this is greater than one. Now observe that
–
the equilibrium for W and g ∗ is continuous in a. Hence, the function j(a) is
also continuous in a. Further, by proposition 1, j(0) p 0. Therefore, if
lim ar0 dj(a)/da 1 1, j(a1) 1 a1 for some a1 1 0. But we also know that j(1) ! 1
(i.e., j lies below the 45-degree line for a p 1) since b(1) ! 1 and f(1) ! 1, so
j(1) p b(1)f(1) ! 1.
Thus, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists â 苸 (0, 1) such that
ˆ p a.
ˆ
j(a)
Proof of Proposition 3
To consider changes in the parameter r, it is convenient to view j(a) as a function
of both a and r: j(a, r) p j(a; r, other parameters). Now, for r p r̄, choose
a small a1 1 0 such that j(a, r̄) 1 a for a 苸 (0, a1). By construction, j is continuous in both a and r. Thus there exists r1 ! r̄ such that, for any r 2 苸 (r1 , r̄),
there exists a 2(r 2) 苸 (0, a1) such that j(a, r 2) 1 a for a 苸 (0, a 2(r 2)). Thus, for
some r 2 ! r̄, there exists a 3 1 0 such that j(a 3 , r 2) 1 a 3 . For this particular r, we
can now construct two positive war equilibria.
For a high positive war equilibrium, recall as in proposition 2 that
j(1, r 2) ! 1. Since j(a 3 , r 2) 1 a 3 , by the intermediate value theorem, there exists
â H 苸 (a 3 , 1) such that j(a H, r 2) p a H.
For a low war equilibrium, recall from the deﬁnition of r̄ that if r ! r̄, then
g0 1 g. In that case,
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b p max {0, g ⫺ g0 }.
∗

Using the deﬁnitions of g0 and g ∗, note that
g ∗ ⫺ g0 p apD ⫺ h(r),
where
h(r) p

pD
rx
⫺
(1 ⫺ p)v 1 ⫺ r

and, by construction, h(r̄) p 0 and h is strictly decreasing in r. Thus, for any
r 0 ! r̄, we can deﬁne a 0 1 0 such that
a 0 pD p h(r 0 ),
noting that, by construction, b(a) p 0 for a 苸 (0, a 0 ). As j(a) p b(a)f(a), this
also implies j(a) p 0 for a ! a 0 . When this argument is applied to r2, this implies
that since r 2 ! r̄, there exists a 4 苸 (0, a 3) such that j(a 4 , r 2) p 0 ! a 4 . Since
j(a 3 , r 2) 1 a 3 , again by the intermediate value theorem, there exists aˆ L 苸
(a 4 , a 3) such that j(a L, r 2) p a L. Since both aL and aH are nonzero, this establishes that, for some r ! r̄, multiple equilibria with a positive frequency of
war exist. To deﬁne r, observe that when r r 0, j(a, r) p 0 for all a 苸 (0, 1].
Thus if r is sufﬁciently small, only the Kant equilibrium exists. Thus r can be
deﬁned as the minimum of the set of r for which multiple equilibria exist. Since
we already demonstrated that this set includes r 3 ! r̄, r is in the interior of
(0, r̄).
Proof of Proposition 4
The multiplicity condition is lim ar0 dj(a)/da 1 1. Stability of the Kant equilibrium
requires lim ar0 dj/da ! 1. Thus the multiplicity condition rules out stability for
the Kant equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 5
Since j(a) is continuous in a and since j(1) ! 1, the largest aˆ must be such that
ˆ da ! 1; hence, it is locally stable. For the Kant equilibrium, we know from
dj(a)/
proposition 3 that there exists a0 such that j(a) p 0 for all a ! a 0 . So suppose
that we have a small deviation from the steady state, j0 p h, where h 苸
ˆ ˆ 0 ) p j(h)
ˆ
(0, a 0 ). Then aˆ 0 p h. But then jˆ 1 p j(a
p 0, which is exactly the
steady state. So the Kant equilibrium is also stable.
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